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1
The purpose of this chapter is to raise some broad issues concerning the role
social pacts can play in solving the most serious problem in the European
economy: the problem of unemployment. As many cases suggest, social pacts
may be able to help cope with the problem in the individual countries in which
they have occurred. But caution must be exercised in extrapolating from those
cases to the European economy as a whole. The countries with social pacts
which are members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) are regions within
a single market, with a single macroeconomic policy, run by the European
Central Bank (ECB), and all trade mostly with each other. Thus, the EMU has
to be understood as a single economic entity and the member countries as units
within it. The contribution that the pacts can make to solving the problem in
that economic entity therefore cannot be assessed by considering each of them
in isolation from each other, individually or comparatively. It can be done only
by considering their joint effects. These are likely to vary depending on the
macroeconomic policies determining demand in Euroland as whole, particularly
the monetary policies implemented by the ECB.
The macroeconomic policy regime built into EMU, particularly as it
seems to be interpreted by the ECB (uncertain as that still is) is a highly
restrictive one that could keep the growth of demand in Euroland as a whole too
low to allow a significant reduction of unemployment to occur. Under those
circumstances, the contributions social pacts can make to reducing
unemployment are limited. Depending on whether there are social pacts in all or
just some of the member states, and which ones they are, the pacts could at best
bring about a marginal reduction in unemployment. Alternatively, they might
simply redistribute unemployment among states with varying success in
reaching social pacts. In the worst case, they might enter into a deflationary
vicious circle of beggar-thy-neighbor internal devaluations whose joint effects
would be an increase in unemployment. Which effects social pacts will have
along this wide range of possibilities will depend very heavily on the rate of
growth of demand the ECB is willing to allow.  So far, there is reason to doubt
that the ECB will create a macroeconomic environment in which social pacts
can contribute significantly to lowering unemployment in Euroland.
                                                          
1
 Prepared for a book on Social Pacts to be published by the Observatoire Social Européen,
Brussels. A previous version was presented at a conference organized by the Observatoire on
February 3, 2000. I am grateful to Anton Hemerijck and other participants in the conference
and to Paul de Grauwe, Ton Notermans, David Soskice, and Wolfgang Streeck for comments
and criticisms on that and earlier versions.  If I had been able to more adequately address all
the issues they raised this version would have been improved much more than it has been.2
This view is elaborated in the following discussion, which is divided into
two main parts.
In the first, I simply set forth the argument that the contributions which
social pacts can make to reducing unemployment are limited by the highly
restrictive macroeconomic policy regime built into EMU, and that
unemployment is likely to fluctuate around high levels as long as that regime
persists. In the second, I offer some support for the argument. In particular, I
suggest that the allocation of responsibility for price stability and employment
institutionalized in the EMU policy regime embodies a mistaken view of the
relationship between macroeconomic policy and unemployment, and that this
view rests heavily on an explanation of why unemployment has been lower in
the U.S. than in Europe since the early 1980s which is seriously flawed because
it fails to take into account the fact that macroeconomic policies have been more
expansionary in the U.S. than in Europe over much of that whole period. I
conclude that European unemployment cannot be brought down toward U.S.
levels unless the current EMU macroeconomic policy regime is replaced by a
similarly more expansionary one, in which Euroland macroeconomic policy,
particularly the ECB’s monetary policy, is made responsible for employment as
well as price stability, and that only then can social pacts make a significant
contribution to reducing unemployment and keeping it low on a sustainable
basis.
2. The EMU Macroeconomic Policy Regime and Unemployment
The basic issue in the debates over European unemployment and policies for
reducing it concerns the relative roles of demand and supply side policies, first,
in causing the high unemployment and, second, curing it. On one side is the
current orthodoxy which insists that the unemployment is almost entirely a
result of structural flaws in markets, particularly labor markets, and that the cure
lies almost entirely in supply side policies that remedy the flaws. On the other
side is the dissenting position that the high unemployment is almost entirely due
to deficient demand resulting from excessively restrictive macroeconomic
policies, and that the cure lies almost entirely in expanding demand. This
difference is reflected in the ECB’s frequent declarations that expansionary
macroeconomic policy should not be used to compensate for the lack of
structural policies,
2 and in its critics’ response that structural reforms, however
                                                          
2. According to ECB President, Wim Duisenberg, "Monetary policy could not compensate for
structural rigidities." Quoted in International Herald Tribune (1999).  According to ECB
Governing Board member Tomasso Padoa-Schioppa, the ECB should avoid the "error [of]3
desirable, should not be used to compensate for excessively restrictive
macroeconomic policy.
3
Many protagonists in these debates actually concede that both demand
and supply side factors are involved, even as they differ over their relative
importance. Indeed, a growing literature argues that both demand and supply
side measures are needed to reduce European unemployment - that a "two-
handed" strategy is needed - and that one without the other can accomplish
much less than the two together can.
4 Even the OECD and the European
Commission now give some recognition to the validity of this position, though
the ECB still does not seem to do so. In any case, the questions of what the
relative importance of the two kinds of factors is and how they interact remain
unsettled. It does seem clear that those questions have to be answered
differently for the causes and cures of Europe’s unemployment. There seems
little room for doubt that European unemployment was driven up by several
successive episodes of highly restrictive macroeconomic policy which sharply
curtailed the growth of demand. On the other hand, a good case can be made
that unemployment which is caused and prolonged by insufficient demand tends
to be transformed into structural unemployment that is increasingly
unresponsive to accelerated demand growth, so that it cannot be cured only by
the expansion of demand but also requires supply side measures. At the same
time, supply side measures alone cannot cure unemployment in the absence of a
sufficient expansion of demand. In this view, then, a combination of demand
expansion and structural reforms, reinforcing each other incrementally over an
extended period, is needed to bring unemployment down.
In contrast, the rationale for the macroeconomic policy regime built into
EMU by the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties, at least as the ECB evidently
interprets it, confines the management of demand to the maintenance of price
stability. Essentially, it denies that macroeconomic policy has any direct
responsibility for growth and employment, assigning virtually all responsibility
for the latter to supply-side or structural policies.
5 The term "policy regime"
refers to the pattern of policy which decision-makers pursue over the long run -
the goals which they prioritize, their conception of how the economy works so
as to affect those goals, and the measures they rely on to influence the economy
                                                                                                                                                                                    
compensating for the lack of structural policies by implementing unnecessary monetary
stimulation." Le Monde (1999).
3. "Structural reforms [may be] badly needed [but] we have to make sure that they are not
mainly needed to compensate for bad macroeconomic policies." Fitoussi (1997).
4. The term "two-handed" strategy was coined in Blanchard et al (1985).
5. The theoretical underpinning of this rationale is the old idea of the long-run neutrality of
money. For a critique, see Notermans (2000), and Ostrup (2000).4
so as to achieve those goals. Other economic actors make their decisions in the
light of their expectations of what the decision-makers will do, based on the
observed pattern of policy as much or more than the decisionmakers’
declarations. Thus, as long as government commitments to a full employment
policy regime were rendered credible by the measures they took, other actors
based their decisions - about investment, wage demands, etc. - on the
expectation that governments would continue to take such measures. To the
extent that governments have instead credibly committed themselves to a price
stability regime, particularly by giving central banks the independence to pursue
that goal, other actors’ expectations and hence their decisions have been
reshaped accordingly.
6
The shift European governments have made to a price stability regime is
clearly reflected in the EMU’s institutional structure. As is well known, the only
macroeconomic policy instrument established for Euroland as a whole is the
monetary policy instrument placed in the hands of the ECB. More independent
than any other central bank in the world, it is required to dedicate monetary
policy to maintaining price stability, as it chooses to define it.
7 There is no
Euroland fiscal policy instrument; only a fiscal policy rule that severely limits
the member states’ discretion in using the only macroeconomic instrument still
available to them. The only formal mechanism concerned with member states’
fiscal policies is the surveillance procedure by which compliance with the fiscal
policy rule is monitored by the Commission and the Council of Economic and
Finance Ministers (ECOFIN). There is no mechanism for authoritatively
coordinating the member states’ fiscal policies so as to construct a fiscal policy
for Euroland as a whole, much less for coordinating fiscal policy with the
ECB’s monetary policy so as to determine a Euroland macroeconomic policy
mix. The ECB president may attend ECOFIN meetings (which include EU
member states not belonging to EMU) and the ECOFIN president and a
Commission member may attend ECB Board meetings, but none have voting
rights in each other’s decision bodies. There is also some potentially more
important scope for informal coordination within the framework of the Euro-11
group - in which the EMU member state finance ministers meet together with
the European Commissioner responsible for economic policy and the president
                                                          
6. This follows the conception of a policy regime in Temin (1989: 91). "The regime is an
abstraction from any single policy decision: it represents the systematic and predictable part of
all decisions. It is the thread that runs through the individual choices that governments and
central banks . . . make. It is visible even though there inevitably will be some loose ends, that
is, some decisions that do not fit the general pattern. These isolated actions have little impact
because they represent exceptions to the policy rule, not new policy regimes." See also
Notermans (2000).
7. The British government sets the inflation goal which the newly independent Bank of
England is mandated to pursue.5
of the ECB prior to the formal meetings of ECOFIN - but it has no decision-
making authority, and, from the ECB’s standpoint, there can be no question of
negotiations over macroeconomic policy. Thus, even if the member states
overcome their conflicting interests enough to coordinate their fiscal policies,
the ECB rejects any negotiation with the member states through which to agree
on a Euroland fiscal-monetary policy mix. Thus, there is no institutional
mechanism by which aggregate demand in Euroland as a whole can be managed
so as to pursue the goal of employment as well as price stability.
A weak form of accountability is imposed on the ECB. It is required to
report annually to the Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament.
The ECB president has to present the report to the Parliament in person, and the
president or other Board member now regularly engages in "monetary dialogue"
with the Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs four times
a year. However, the Parliament cannot instruct the ECB or even negotiate
agreements with it any more than any of the other bodies can, and does not have
the implicit leverage over the ECB that the U.S. Congress has over the Federal
Reserve Bank (Fed) by virture of the fact that the Fed’s very existence and
duties rest on legislation enacted by Congress, which it can change, and has
changed. In contrast, nothing short of a unanimous decision of the member
states to revise the Treaty can change the ECB’s legal status and mandate.
8
This allocation of responsibility for the different elements of economic
policy, and particularly the insulation of the only form of demand management
there is for Euroland as a whole from political deliberation, is also reflected in
the EU’s so-called Employment Strategy. Launched at the special 1997
Luxembourg Summit after employment was declared an EU goal in the
Amsterdam Treaty, the strategy is almost entirely about supply side changes
while demand management, which is exclusively in the ECB’s monetary policy
domain, is kept off limits.
                                                          
8. The Treaty, in Article 105, says that "Without prejudice to the objective of price stability,
the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Community with a view to
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article
2." The objectives laid down in Article 2 include "a high level of employment and social
protection." However, there is no institutional mechanism by which the member states,
through Community institutions or otherwise, can determine how the goal of price stability is
defined or require the ECB to pursue it in way that supports the general economic policies on
which they may decide. The Community economic policies are defined by the Broad
Economic Policy Guidelines adopted by ECOFIN but they are not binding on the ECB beyond
the loose obligation imposed by Article 105. The ECB’s reporting obligations are spelled out
in Article 109b.6
This policy regime and the political structure that perpetuates it consigns
social pacts largely to the supply side and structural measures to which the
employment strategy is effectively confined. This is so except insofar as the
pacts include wage restraint, as many pacts do, given that the overall rate of
growth of wages is an essential component of the macroeconomic policy mix.
Aside from that, social pacts are inherently about the supply side because in
EMU they have no leverage on the only macroeconomic policy there is for
Euroland, i.e., the ECB’s monetary policy. So far, the pacts are national deals,
and national governments, whether they are parties to the deals as they typically
are or base their positions on deals struck only between the social partners, are
constitutionally denied any voice in the ECB’s policy decisions. Even if there
could be a Euro-zone social pact among governments, unions, and employers, it
would still have no leverage over ECB decision-making, just as the member
state governments acting in the Euro-11 council or more formally in the EU
Councils, cannot compel the ECB to reconcile its monetary policy with their
employment goals. The macroeconomic dialogue introduced by the 1999
Cologne summit does not change this in any fundamental way.
9
It is precisely this relegation of social pacts to the supply side that
severely limits what they can be expected to accomplish toward reducing
unemployment. This is not to deny that social pacts can accomplish something
toward that end. If one looks at individual countries, a good case can be made
that social pacts have contributed to the reduction of unemployment, by
restraining wage growth, flexibilizing employment regulations, etc. There are
clear differences in levels of unemployment among European countries,
whether within EMU or not, and it is plausible that social pacts help explain
lower levels in some countries.
10 Social pacts have been reached in most of
those countries and have contributed to structural reforms in labor and product
                                                          
9. Under the German Presidency, the June 1999 Cologne European Council adopted a
resolution providing for a Macroeconomic Dialogue, consisting of two meetings a year at
which representatives of the three European level peak organizations of unions and employers
(ETUC, UNICE, CEEP), the ECOFIN and Labor and Social Affairs Councils (member state
cabinet ministers), the Commission, and the ECB are to exchange views on economic policy
in the EU. The meetings occur in association with ECOFIN meetings dealing with the Broad
Economic Policy Guidelines prescribed by the Treaty, and each of these "political level"
meetings is to be prepared by a "technical level" meeting of representatives of the
participating bodies. The first meetings took place in October and November 1999.
10. At the low end of the range in 1997, unemployment was 4.4 percent in Austria, 5.2 percent
in the Netherlands, and 5.5 percent in Denmark, while at the high end it was 12.4 percent in
Italy, 12.1 percent in France and 10 percent in Germany. It was 13.3 percent in Finland but it
represents a special case, in which unemployment has been rapidly declining. OECD
Economic Outlook, 64 (December 1998), Annex Table 22. See also Blanchard and Wolfers
(1999).7
markets, which in turn probably contributed to the lower levels of
unemployment.
11 This would be consistent with the general proposition that
variations in the institutions that structure markets result in different levels of
unemployment at a given level of demand.
Yet, if one shifts one’s perspective from individual countries to Euroland
as a whole, then it is not clear that social pacts have contributed much, if
anything, to reducing the aggregate levels of unemployment in the Euroland
economy. They may indeed have succeeded only in redistributing employment,
enabling some countries to capture an increased share of the demand to which
macroeconomic policy has limited the Euroland economy. This they can do by
securing a real devaluation through pacts that lower unit labor costs relative to
those in the other member countries in ways other than the reduction of nominal
exchange rates that are rendered impossible within EMU, or by increasing
productivity faster than in other member countries. This is what the Dutch are
alleged to have done through wage restraint aimed at keeping Dutch wage
growth at some 20 percent below German wage growth.
12 Of course, in EU
countries outside EMU that retain the possibility of floating exchange rates,
social pacts can also serve in similar ways to preserve any real exchange rate
advantages that might be gained by nominal depreciation against the Euro or
other currencies. In other words, social pacts can serve and evidently have
served as instruments of national competition. Thus, social pacts have been
quite aptly characterized as "competitive corporatism" (Rhodes, 1998, 2000).
But what is rational for each individual country that successfully engages
in competitive corporatism is not necessarily collectively rational for the set of
interacting countries as a whole. It is not possible for every EMU country to
improve its competitive position by a real devaluation any more than it is for
every country in the international economy to achieve an export surplus. In such
a competitive game, there will necessarily be relative gainers and losers, with
different net effects on employment in the multi-country economy as a whole,
depending on the growth of demand in the economy as a whole. There is a wide
range of possible net effects. If there is insufficient demand growth, the inter-
country distribution of employment growth could be affected without any net
reduction of unemployment - the gains in employment achieved by some
countries could be at the expense of foregone employment growth in others.  In
the worst case scenario, there could be a net diminution of employment if each
country seeks to retaliate against the internal devaluations by others with
internal devaluations of their own - whether by social pacts or some less
                                                          
11. International Labour Organization (1999). Barrell and Genre (1999).
12. Soskice (2000: 63). This view is contested, however. See Hemerijck et al. (2000) in this
volume.8
attractive methods - possibly setting in train a deflationary vicious circle that
could diminish demand in the multi-country economy unless there is an
offsetting expansion of demand by some institutions with the capacity for it,
such as Euroland’s ECB.
13 Employment will grow in all only if there is
sufficient demand growth to support it, even if it grows faster in some than in
others as a result of differential success in reducing unit labor costs.  In
Euroland as a whole, in other words, the net employment effects of social pacts
in some or all of the member states depends on the rate at which the ECB
decides that demand should be allowed to grow.
Summing up, social pacts fit well into Europe’s Employment Strategy
with its focus on the supply side and exclusion of the demand side. But that is
precisely why the pacts cannot contribute much to reducing unemployment in
Europe, insofar as that strategy relies on supply side measures alone to do the
trick. It thus leaves unchallenged the ECB’s apparent position on the matter. If
there is a change in that position and the ECB acknowledges that it has some
responsibility for employment as well as price stability, and that monetary
policy has to sustain expectations of continued growth in demand if
unemployment is to be brought down, social pacts could play a more positive
role. They could significantly contribute to a "two-handed" strategy for doing so
by helping to keep wage growth from accelerating and to make social policy
and labor market institutions more "employment friendly." If there is no such
change in the ECB’s position, however, Europe will be condemned to
struggling against unemployment with one hand tied behind its back, unless
there is the political will to challenge the fundamental rationale and change the
institutional structure of the current EMU macroeconomic policy regime.
So far I have simply asserted the argument that the potential contribution
of social pacts to solving Europe’s problem of unemployment is severely
limited as long as there is no shift from the current restrictive macroceonomic
policy regime to a more expansionary one. But is it valid? Some support for the
argument, however partial and tentative, is presented in the remainder of this
chapter.
                                                          
13. The possibility that social pacts could degenerate into a vicious circle of beggar-thy-
neighbor competitive wage cuts is stressed by Bispinck and Schulten (1999).9
3. Unemployment in Europe and America: Divergent Trends and
Conflicting Explanations
The rationale for the EMU policy regime, which assigns price stability to
demand management, principally by monetary policy, while assigning
employment to supply-side policies, principally those which increase the
flexibility of labor markets, rests heavily on an explanation of why
unemployment rates have been higher in Europe than in the U.S. since the early
1980s, with the gap in favor of the U.S. increasing further in the 1990s (Figure
1).  According to that explanation, the difference in employment performance is
almost entirely accounted for by differences in the structures of labor and
product markets.  The greater emphasis seems to be placed on the differences in
the interacting sets of social policy and industrial relations institutions that
structure and condition the operation of labor markets, or what we can call the
labor regimes, in Europe and the U.S. The differences are familiar. Briefly
summarized, collective bargaining, labor law, and taxes and transfers play a
much larger role in determining the terms of employment, disposable income,
and alternatives to employment incomes in Europe than in the U.S., with its
weak unions, limited labor market regulation, and residual welfare state.
14 The
European labor regime thus provides people with more protection against the
risks inherent in labor market participation while contributing to relatively
lower inequality than the U.S. labor regime does.  But for this very reason ,
according to the EMU orthodoxy, it also results in higher unemployment in
Europe because it makes the European labor market more rigid than the
American, thereby retarding the adjustment of labor to changes in the level and
composition of demand for labor. It is thus the purportedly greater flexibility of
the American labor market that is credited with the much greater success of the
American "jobs machine" in providing employment since the early 1980s. Most
of Europe’s high unemployment can accordingly be remedied by "structural
reforms" that make European labor regimes more like the American one.
15
When the trends since the early 1980s and also over a longer span are
examined more closely, however, this explanation is called into question.
16 In
                                                          
14. The contrast is between the U.S. and continental Europe insofar as the British labor regime
has become increasingly like the American.
15. According to a member of the ECB governing board who required anonymity, Europe
could solve its unemployment problem by importing the American labor market. The
attribution of unemployment to "rigidities" in the European labor market is certainly not new.
An earlier statement of it is Giersch’s essay on "Eurosclerosis" (1985). The OECD Jobs Study
(1994), along with its successor documents, is the canonical elaboration of this view. A recent
brief summary is Siebert (1997).
16. For an earlier comprehensive analysis which concludes that "comme l’inflation, le
chomage reste du domaine des politiques macroéconomiques," see Muet (1994: 38)10
the discussion that follows, I consider the consistency of these trends first with
the labor regime explanation, then with an alternative in which they are
explained by differences in macroeconomic policy, and finally with an
explanation based on the interaction of labor regimes and macroceonomic
policy.
3.1. Unemployment Fluctuations and the Labor Regime Explanation
What is most striking over the longer period is that the relationship between
unemployment trends in Europe and the U.S. since 1983 is a reversal of the
relationship that prevailed throughout most of the preceding decades following
postwar recovery. Moreover, during the four years preceding 1983 in which the
largest part of the rise in European unemployment occurred, from around an
average of about 5 to nearly 10 percent, U.S. unemployment was not only
slightly higher but also rose in parallel with European unemployment, except in
the last year of this subperiod when the gap in favor of Europe was closed by a
slight decline in the U.S. Then the gap switches dramatically in favor of the
U.S. when unemployment drops sharply in 1984 while continuing to rise in
Europe, widening further in the following two years, though at a slower pace.
But then the gap narrows slightly as unemployment declines in Europe a little
faster than its continued decline in the U.S. and slight rise in 1990, and it
narrows slightly more as unemployment rises more steeply in both economies
during the next two years. It is after 1992 that the gap in favor of the U.S.
reopens and grows more sharply than ever as unemployment there abruptly
begins its long sustained decline while unemployment in Europe continues its
steep rise to a plateau of nearly 12 percent where it stays for the next few years
until it beginsa gradual fall in the two most recent years.
These observations raise a number of questions about the labor regime
explanation. To begin with, have there been changes in European and American
labor regimes that are fairly consistently correlated, perhaps with some lags,
with the changing relationships between unemployment trends in the two
regions? If there have been, that would strongly suggest a causal link between
the labor regimes and unemployment trends, even if it would remain to be
demonstrated. Thus, if there were changes in one or the other or both labor
regimes prior to or around the main reversal in the relationship in 1983 that
would have made the European regime relatively more unfavorable to
employment - presumably more "rigid" - than it had been in the earlier postwar
period, that might well be why the reversal occurred. But if there were labor
regime changes with such direct causal effects, the later 1980s present a puzzle.
That is when the trend in European employment performance was as good or
better than in America - though the gap that had opened up was only slightly11
narrowed. Were the effects of the labor regime changes suspended during those
years? If so, why were they suspended? Were they then resumed in the 1990s?
If so, why? And was their resumption enough to account for the renewed and
even greater deterioration in Europe’s relative employment performance? If not,
what further changes in the European and American labor regimes occurred to
account for it? As implied by these questions, for any labor regime changes
themselves to have had such on and off effects seems implausible, so if there
were changes that made those in Europe relatively more unfavorable to
employment than the American one, they could account for the variations in the
employment performance gap between the two regions only insofar as they
interacted with other factors, including macroeconomic policy, making them
have different effects under different conditions.
Figure 1.
However, a preliminary search finds little evidence of labor regime changes
consistent with those variations, even if the late 1980s are set aside.
 17  Most of
the build-up welfare states and strengthening of unions in Europe occurs in the
                                                          
17. The preliminary character of the search must be stressed. I make no claim to an exhaustive
search of the relevant literature bearing on the issues involved here; only that there is enough
evidence to be at least skeptical of the labor regime argument. Note that the issue here is
whether labor regime factors provide all or most of the explanation, not whether they provide
part of the explanation. That they do so by the way they interact with macroeconomic policy is
argued section 3.3.
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earlier postwar decades when unemployment was lower there than in the U.S.
There are some further increases in the generosity of the welfare state and rigor
of labor standards in some European countries over the last couple of decades,
but the general trend seems to be in the other direction (OECD, 1998, Nickell,
1997, Clayton and Pontusson , 1998, Pierson 2000). Although there is no major
retrenchment in social policy or attack on labor rights in any European countries
except Britain under Thatcher, there are various changes such as reductions in
replacement ratios, tightened eligibility rules, some weakening of unions and
decentralization of collective bargaining. These are unevenly scattered around
continental Europe but their overall effect should have been to make labor
markets less rather than more rigid over the period as a whole, though perhaps
not much less so and certainly not as much as the OECD and others have been
urging (Blanchard, 1999, Gregg and Manning 1997). And insofar as there have
been changes in either direction, there does not seem to be any systematic
relationship between their timing and the fluctuations in the employment
performance gap in the sub-periods since the early 1980s.
There is more evidence of changes in the American labor regime that
increase the difference between it and the continental European regimes in ways
consistent with the labor regime explanation. Thatcher’s policies in Britain were
in some respects paralleled by the Reagan Administration’s attack on unions
(encouraging intensified attacks by management) and erosion of various social
benefits, while the elimination of "welfare as we knew it" during the Clinton
Administration took the U.S. another step away from a welfare state toward a
"workfare state." These changes could have contributed to a lower equilibrium
unemployment rate in the U.S., permitting unemployment to reach the lowest
levels in decades before any signs of renewed inflation appeared. Some argue
that this is particularly due to the prolonged decline of American unions, which
has left the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) free to relax monetary policy more
quickly than European central banks faced with strong unions, though others
cite evidence to the contrary. But if Fed policy has been more expansionary as a
result of this particular, ostensibly growing, divergence between American and
European labor regimes, it is not that divergence alone but its interaction with
differences in monetary policy that offers an explanation of the variations in the
employment performance gap.
However, even in the absence of changes in the labor regimes preceding
or coinciding with these variations, the labor regime explanation could
nevertheless be right. Various mechanisms have been suggested by which
constant differences in labor regimes could produce the successively wider gaps
between unemployment in Europe and the U.S.  One is that greater "rigidities"
in European labor markets, even if unchanged, make any increases in13
unemployment from whatever cause more durable than in the U.S. Thus, an
increase in unemployment resulting from a shock, such as a demand deficiency
induced by domestic policy or by external developments (e.g., oil price
increases, recessions abroad), will tend to persist longer in Europe and be less
responsive to a reversal of the conditions that produced it to begin with. To the
extent that the unemployment produced by one shock is not eliminated by the
time the next shock occurs, unemployment from the new shock starts from a
higher level than at the time of the preceding shock, adding to the
unemployment remaining from the previous one. Unemployment is thus
ratcheted up by successive shocks, resulting in an upward secular trend.
Various features of European labor markets are said to give them the
rigidities that make unemployment last longer. The list includes high minimum
wages, unemployment benefits, and taxes on labor. They are described as
having the net effect of making it "difficult (and/or unattractive)" for workers to
find jobs at wages corresponding to the decline in productivity that increases
with the duration of their unemployment (De Grauwe, 1998: 5). These and other
features of European labor markets are discussed more fully below. Here it
suffices to note that this mechanism depends on how much of a given volume of
unemployment is responsive to a reversal of the conditions that caused it and, if
so, at what rate. Insofar as unemployment is responsive to increases in demand
for labor, and if the demand for labor is at all affected by domestic policy, then
the extent to which the labor market institutions produce an upward secular
trend may depend on whether policy increases the demand for labor quickly
enough to limit the unemployment resulting from a given shock and keeps it
rising long enough to eliminate all the unemployment resulting from that shock,
whether policy-induced or not. Thus, if macroeconomic policy stays restrictive
too long, or becomes restrictive again too quickly, relative to the (institutionally
determined) reaction time of unemployment to demand for labor, any upward
secular trend would be accounted for at least partly by macroeconomic policy. If
European macroeconomic policy displays these characteristics more than
American policy in the periods when European unemployment is increasingly
higher than in the U.S., that policy difference would have to be part of the
explanation for the growing employment performance gap.
Other mechanisms by which differences in labor market institutions could
account for the variaitions in the employment performance gap have been
suggested even if there were no changes in the institutions, including those that
structure wage determination as well those like the ones cited earlier which
affect incentives to offer or accept jobs. But again, as I suggest in more detailed
discussion below, it is not the labor regime differences alone but their
interaction with other factors that provide the explanation. Before proceeding14
with that discusson, however, it is necessary to consider the differences in
macroeconomic policy.
3.2 . The Macroeconomic Policy Explanation
The evidence for the argument that differences in macroeconomic policy largely
account for the differences between European and American employment
performance seems clearer, with respect to timing as well as the policy-mix,
than the evidence for the labor regime explanation. Over a period of nearly two
decades following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, virtually all
OECD countries eventually reacted to the difficulty of maintaining full
employment without inflation by shifting toward more restrictive
macroeconomic policy regimes, giving top priority to price stability and relying
on monetary policy to achieve it (Notermans, 2000).
Germany’s Bundesbank was a leader in this regime shift, announcing it in
1974 and acting as a driving force since then. In the U.S., the Carter
Administration gave up on its efforts to curb inflation in the face of OPEC II
and turned the task over to the Fed, whose drastic tightening of monetary policy
necessarily had the greatest international contractionary repercussions. In
France, the Mitterand government’s attempt at domestic expansion in the face
of that "monetarist shock" - while France was particulary ill-equipped with the
institutions with which to avert the expansion’s inflationary effects - ended with
the 1982-83 U-turn that marked its shift to the price stability regime. Even
Sweden, ostensibly among the best equipped with the requisite institutions,
made the shift in 1990 after an initially successful but ultimately failed attempt
to find a "Third Road" between Thatcherite contraction and Mitterand’s
unsustainable domestic expansion.
18 Finally, this shift was incorporated into the
construction of EMU, supported by the conviction that price stability must be
the main aim that now prevails among economic policy-decision makers in most
OECD governments - the finance ministers and central bankers who, along with
many economists, form a kind of epistemic community that enforces this
"pensée unique" intellectually as well as politically (McNamara, 1998).
However, there emerged a significant difference in the priority given to
price stability over growth and employment and the way in which price stability
was pursued in Europe, principally by the Bundesbank - which effectively set
monetary policy for the rest of Europe - and in the U.S., by the Fed. This
difference in macroeconomic policies, according to the alternative explanation,
is the main factor underlying the reversal of the relationship between
                                                          
18. The Swedish Social Democrats’ "Third Road" is not to be confused with Tony Blair’s
"Third Way." For an analysis of the Swedish attempt and its failure, see Martin (2000).15
unemployment trends in Europe and the U.S. since 1983. The contrasting
policies and their relationship to the employment performance variations are
described in the following discussion but only one indicator of the differences
between Fed and Bundesbank monetary policies is provided in the form of a
comparison of yield spreads in Figure 2. The yield spread – the difference
between real short term interest rates, set by central banks, and real long-term
interest rates, set by bond markets – serves as a measure of the restrictiveness of
monetary policy. Monetary policy can be said to be more expansionary the
larger the positive spread – i.e. the lower that short-term rates set by central
banks are relative to the long-term rates set by bond markets on the basis of
inflationary expectations. As the spread declines to zero and turns negative –
i.e., short-term rates become higher than long-term rates – monetary policy
becomes increasingly restrictive.
19
In the years after OPEC II when unemployment was rising steeply in both
America and Europe, the extreme tightening of monetary policy by the Fed
seemed to signal a shift to a price stability regime every bit as restrictive as that
toward which European policy-makers were moving; indeed, the Fed took over
the lead, closely followed by the British government, and adopted an even more
restrictive stance than the Bundesbank did. But by 1983 the Fed had reversed
itself and moved as strongly in an expansionary direction as it had in a
restrictive direction. The Bundesbank reversed course as well but already began
tightening monetary policy again while the Fed continued on an expansionary
course for another two years. By the time Fed policy also turned restrictive
again, highly expansionary fiscal policy had the U.S. economy booming. The
Reagan Administration’s huge tax cuts and increases in military spending
combined with Congressional Democrats’ resistance to large cuts in civilian
spending to produce the largest peacetime fiscal stimulus in the country’s
history until then, implying at least a partial reversal of the earlier shift to a
price stability regime. This marked divergence in macroeconomic policy stances
in Europe and the U.S. coincided very closely with the first sharp deterioration
in Europe’s relative employment performance from 1983 to 1986.
Figure 2.
                                                          
19. It would obviously be better to relate a measure of differences in monetary policy directly
to the differences in unemployment in a single chart. This will be done future work but it
would be better still to provide a formal analysis of the relationship, preferably within a
macroeconomic model. If there is such an analysis in the literature, it has not been found yet.16
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The ensuing exchange rate gyrations and policy conflicts between American
and European governments, which triggered the relaunch of monetary
integration, complicates the comparison of policies and performance in the later
1980s (Henning, 1998). Except for 1987, when the Bundesbank’s sharp
tightening was blamed for the stock market crash, its policy in those years was
less restrictive than the Fed’s, and fiscal policies were more expansionary in
Europe than America, notwithstanding the large Federal budget deficit that
remained. The European economy received a powerful additional fiscal boost
from the large budget deficits by which the German government financed
unification. This offset the recessionary tendencies that had set in, as did a
substantial easing of monetary policy by the Fed. This policy scenario is
consistent with the slight narrowing of the unemployment gap between Europe
and America, as unemployment fell until 1990 and then rose again in the next
two years in both economies. Indeed, this is the period in which employment
growth in Europe matched that in the American "jobs machine," despite the
absence of any significant convergence of the respective labor regimes.
The end of that period was the point at which both policies and
peformance again diverged sharply, producing by far the largest gap yet
between European and American unemployment. While the Fed continued
reducing interest rates, kept them low between 1991 and 1993, and varied them17
slightly around a slightly higher level since then, the Bundesbank increased
interest rates continuously beginning in 1988 until monetary policy became
extremely tight in 1992, and then only slowly relaxed it in the following years.
This combined with the tightening of fiscal policy due to the unyielding
implementation of the EMU transition rules to make macroeconomic policy so
contractionary as to plunge Germany and with it the rest of Europe into the
deepest recession of the whole postwar period. The unfortunate responses of
many actors to the issues posed by unification and the distribution of its
economic burdens - which vastly exceeded optimistic expectations - all
contributed to this disaster in a sequence of events too complex to describe
here. What seems clear enough, however, is that the resulting macroeconomic
policy mix drove unemployment in Europe up to record levels, while in the U.S.
growth sustained by the relaxation of monetary policy made it possible to
gradually reduce the Federal deficit without offsetting the expansionary effect
of lower interest rates, bringing unemployment down to the lowest levels in
decades.
20
The apparently strong consistencies between contrasting macroeconomic
policies and unemployment trends and weak or absent consistencies between
labor regime variations and those same trends, preliminary and elementary as
their analysis has been, suggests pretty strongly that the differences in
macroeconomic policy are at least a large part of the explanation for the
difference in unemployment trends in Europe and America. How large a part?
And could they be the whole of the explanation? This is quite doubtful in view
of the initial discussion of the labor regime explanation. While that discussion
also made it quite doubtful that labor regime differences could be the whole
explanation, it suggested that they may nevertheless be part of the explanation.
3.3 . The Interaction Explanation
If labor regime differences are part of the explanation, then the causes of
unemployment and also the cures for it must lie in the ways in which
macroeconomic policies and labor regimes interact. The view that the
explanation lies in both and how they interact receives strong though partial and
tentative support from a recent econometric analysis designed to explain both
the levels of European unemployment and its variation among European
countries. It may be the most ambitious attempt yet made to overcome the
limitations of explanations based solely on either shocks or institutions. In the
                                                          
20. The principal sources of the preceding account are the OECD country surveys and semi-
annual Economic Outlook. For other comparisons of the policy-mix in the U.S. and Europe,
particularly the sequencing of monetary stimulus and fiscal consolidation, see Baker and
Schmitt (1999), De Grauwe (1998), Horn and Scheremet (1999), and Muet (1998)..18
work done so far, "specifications that allow for shocks, institutions, and
interactions can account both for much of the rise and much of the
heterogeneity in the evolution of unemployment in Europe" (Blanchard and
Wolfers, 1999). If that analysis were extended to include the U.S., it could be
expected to support the view that the interaction of macroeconomic policy
(whatever other sources of shocks there have been) and labor regimes largely
explains the U.S.-Europe difference in unemployment trends. Other
comparisons among the European economies as well as between them and the
U.S. point strongly in this direction. There is great variation among them in
labor market outcomes, as noted earlier, with unemployment higher than in the
U.S. in some but lower in others over recent years. There is much work,
including that on social pacts, suggesting that differences in the institutions that
structure those labor markets at least partly explain the variation.
At the same time, careful analysis of the institutions calls attention to the
need to differentiate among specific labor regime institutions rather than
lumping them together in terms of generalized rigidity or flexibility, since
different institutions have quite diverse effects on employment (Nickell, 1997,
Nickell and Layard, 1999, OECD, 1999). Thus, some which make labor markets
more "rigid" - e.g., protections against arbitrary dismissal - do not necessarily
affect employment adversely, or affect employment differently depending on
whether unemployment is increasing or decreasing. Moreover, the effects of
some seem to depend on the presence or absence of other aspects of labor
regimes - e.g., relatively high unemployment benefits are thought to contribute
less to unemployment when they are coupled with strong requirements and
support for re-employment than when they are not (Nickell, 1997). While the
short-run unemployment effects of a given macroeconomic policy shift (or other
shock) may vary as a result of such institutional differences, the latter may also
have longer-run effects. For example, differences in institutions that result in
variations in the distribution of unemployment of varying duration may affect
the responsiveness of total unemployment to increases in demand, whether or
not the latter are policy induced. More generally, institutions that make for
greater persistence of unemployment than others may have cumulative effects,
resulting in an upward secular trend in unemployment as successive cyclical
downturns start at higher unemployment levels. As indicated earlier, it is argued
that such path dependence or "hysteresis" at least partly accounts for the
divergence between U.S. and European unemployment trends. Differences in
institutions that structure wage determination may also have consequences for
unemployment through long-run effects on investment behavior. To illustrate
these possibilities, some of the main mechanisms can be sketched more fully.19
Discussions of the relationship between labor market institutions and
unemployment typically focus on the institutions’ effects on wage
determination, through their impact on workers’ bargaining power and the
incentive structure influencing how bargaining power is used. The basic idea is
that through either channel, the institutions affect the equilibrium level of
unemployment or steady state unemployment. This is commonly conceived as
the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) or non-
accelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU), and used as the basis for
estimating the portion of actual unemployment that is "structural" - due to the
structure of markets - as opposed to "cyclical" - due to the level of aggregate
demand. The concept and the efforts to estimate its actual level are
problematical, particularly because the estimated levels seem to be so variable,
rising and falling with levels of actual unemployment.
21 Hence, the estimates
and the validity of the concept itself are central issues in controversy over the
causes and cures of unemployment. For present purposes, however, the concept
can be assumed valid at least in the minimal sense that variations in
unemployment have effects on the intensity of pressures for wage increases,
depending on how institutions affect wage bargaining. The effects of the
resulting wage growth on unemployment in turn depends on the reactions of
other actors - employers on the one hand, and macroeconomic policy decision-
makers on the other.
If worker bargaining power depends generally on the tightness of labor
markets, the way that bargaining power is used may depend most on variations
in the labor regime institutions that structure wage bargaining, principally trade
unions and employer organizations. The familiar argument is that there is a
hump-shaped relationship between variations in wage bargaining structure and
the tendency for wage growth (and hence inflation) to accelerate as
unemployment declines. Thus, the tendency is lowest toward either end of the
range of variation where unions are weak and wage bargaining highly
decentralized, as in the U.S., or unions are strong and bargaining is highly
coordinated, as in Germany or Austria, while it is at its highest in the middle of
the range where unions are strong but bargaining is not coordinated, as perhaps
in Sweden since centralized bargaining was replaced by sectoral bargaining. As
initially formulated, the argument focused on variations in union scope and
structure and their consequences for union power and incentives to externalize
or internalize the inflation or employment costs of wage increases. In this view,
                                                          
21. Much policy discussion concerning the share of unemployment attributable to "rigidities"
in labor market structures relies on estimates of the NAWRU by the OECD. But the
methodology of those estimates has been criticized as seriously flawed. See Holden and
Nymoen (1998), Staiger et al (1997), and McAdam (199?). The problems with the concept as
applied in practice are not described here but skepticism is clearly warranted.20
what makes the intermediate case the most costly is that the unions there have
both the incentive - because their membership is a small enough portion of the
labor force - and sufficient market power to externalize the price or employment
effects of their wage increases (Calmfors and Drifill, 1988, Calmfors, 1993,
OECD, 1997).
More recent versions have modified the argument in two respects. First, it
is pointed out that coordination can be achieved by employer organization as
well as or instead of by unions, and second, that wage bargaining structures do
not determine actual unemployment levels alone but in combination with
macroeconomic policy, particularly monetary policy. Central banks are thus
said to tighten monetary policy less and ease it more readily where they face
wage bargaining structures that contribute to lower equilibrium rates, achieving
a given price stability target at a lower cost in unemployment, than where they
face structures that raise the equilibrium rate. The conclusion drawn is that
neither central bank independence nor either of the less inflationary bargaining
structures by itself but rather their interaction when both are present achieves
price stability at least cost in unemployment (Soskice,1990, Hall and Franzese,
1998, Iversen, 1998).
If this argument is valid, it lends some support to the view, mentioned
above, that Fed monetary policy has been more expansionary over the cycle
than the Bundesbank’s because it does not interact with strong unions as the
Bundesbank did. In this way it offers support for the view that differences
between the American and European labor regimes at least partly explain why
unemployment has been lower in the U.S. than Europe, but only in conjunction
with macroeconomic policy. On the other hand, the wage bargaining structure
that faced the Bundesbank was one characterized not only by strong unions but
also a high degree of coordination, which should supposedly have led as
effectively to a low equilibrium rate as the decentralized bargaining structure in
the U.S. Accordingly, the difference between American and German wage
bargaining structures does not seem to adequately explain why the Fed has had
a more symmetrical reaction function than the Bundesbank.
Variations in wage bargaining structures may have much longer-term
effects on unemployment. Thus, the reversal in the relationship between
unemployment trends in Europe and the U.S. since 1983 may have had its
source in wage developments prior to the reversal which had long-run effects on
investment. It seems generally agreed that total productivity growth declined
throughout the OECD area in the early 1970s (Blanchard 1999: 2, Armstrong et
al., 1991: 241). This, along with the first oil shock, meant that profits could not21
be maintained unless wage growth slowed down.
22 It evidently did not slow
down as rapidly in Europe as in the U.S., as indicated by the fact that the labor
share of value-added rose in Europe to a peak in the mid-1970s after which it
fell fairly continuously, while in the U.S. the labor share varied cyclically
without displaying any long-term trend.
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An explanation for this difference in the behavior of relative shares given
in a recent study is that it reflected an "institutional environment" which gave
greater bargaining power to workers in Europe than in the U.S. (presumably
amplified by the lower unemployment in Europe than in the U.S. at the time),
while higher unemployment subsequently reduced European workers’
bargaining power, offsetting the "institutional bias" in their favor. The question
then posed is why unemployment did not eventually fall after the capital share
was restored to its earlier level, which should have revived investment, growth
and employment. The answer offered is that European firms responded to the
initial decline in the capital share by choosing technology that increased the
capital intensity of production, in contrast with American firms which, not faced
by the same decline in capital share, did not increase the capital intensity of
production. The relative increase in European capital intensity necessarily took
time since it could occur only gradually as successive vintages of capital were
replaced, but the cumulative effect has been to raise the long-run elasticity of
substitution between labor and capital, while it remained roughly constant in the
U.S. Investment did revive in Europe but each increment resulted in a smaller
increase in employment than the same increment of investment in the U.S., so
that, as often heard in European discussion, the employment content of growth
is too low to bring about as much of a reduction in unemployment as similar
growth rates would have in the past. The argument is that this rather than
demand deficiency attributable to restrictive macroeconomic policy explains the
growing difference between European and American unemployment trends.
This argument is not convincing. Even if there has been a relative
increase in capital intensity in Europe, it is not clear why this should not be
compatible with a narrowing of the difference in unemployment rates if there is
sufficient growth in demand, providing that whatever other "structural"
conditions might be necessary are met. Thus, the differences in macroeconomic
policy that markedly affected demand growth could still have had a large part in
                                                          
22. "If workers and firms are slow to adapt to this new reality, wages increase too fast.
Employment falls and so does the profit rate. Investment falls, leading to lower capital
accumulation, and a further decrease in employment. The result is higher unemployment for
some time. But for how long? Theory and empirical evidence strongly suggest that the answer
is not forever" (Blanchard, 1999:2-3).
23. This observation and the discussion which follows is drawn from Berthold et al. (2000).22
producing the divergence in unemployment. What the capital intensity argument
seems to tell us is that there has been a secular shift in how investment decision-
makers respond to what they expect the rate of growth of demand will be. They
have to be concerned about expected demand growth to decide how much
increase in production capacity is likely to be profitable, whatever the capital
intensity of the production. Their expectations are bound to be significantly
shaped by the rate of growth they believe macroeconomic policy authorities,
particularly central banks, are likely to consistently permit over the time frame
relevant to the profitablity of investments. The growth in capacity, and
associated growth in employment at the given capital intensity, will presumably
be adapted to the trend in demand growth that can be expected to result from the
observable macroeconomic policy regime. Moreover, even if the average level
of capital intensity has increased, employment growth in response to a given
level of demand may be expected to vary with the differences in capital
intensity across the economy. Through such shifts in the distribution of
employment and other mechanisms, the economy as a whole should adapt to the
change in technology over the long run, with the employment effects at any
given stage contingent on the growth of demand as well as the effectiveness of
the adaptation process. Such adaptation has historically confounded dire
predictions that technological change will produce unemployment.
24
In short, the postulated long-run effects of wage behavior on
unemployment through the mechanism of increased capital intensity may help
us understand how labor market institutions and macroeconomic policy interact,
rather than providing us with reason to doubt that macroeconomic policy
divergence has played a large part in the divergence between unemployment in
Europe and the United States.
The effects of unemployment on wage pressures, and feedback onto
actual unemployment are also related to differences in other labor regime
institutions, such as employment protection and unemployment benefits. The
effects of differences in such institutions on equilibrium unemployment are
thought to operate by varying the proportion of actual unemployment that exerts
downward pressure on wages (Blanchard, 1999: 14-18).
For example, it is argued that such pressure on wages diminishes as the
proportion of long-term unemployed (usually understood as more than 6 or 12
months) increases. This is because the longer workers are unemployed, the more
difficult it is for them to get re-employed for a variety of reasons, including the
                                                          
24. "There is surely no long-run relation between the level of technology and the level of
unemployment. And, if there is a long-run relation between the rate of technology progress
and the unemployment rate, it appears to be a weak one at best" (Blanchard 1999: 3).23
objective obsolescence and even deterioration of skills and the subjective
tendency of prospective employers to believe that nobody else has hired
workers unemployed over a long period because there is something that makes
them undesirable employees. Insofar as employers accordingly regard the long-
term unemployed as unemployable or risky to employ, and insofar as the long-
term unemployed, partially as a consequence, are no longer actively searching,
workers who do have jobs do not regard them as competitors for their jobs or
for alternative jobs they could quickly get if, because their bargained wages
exceed what employers can or want to pay, they lose their current jobs. In other
words, it is primarily short-term unemployment rather than total unemployment
that is thought to inhibit wage pressures. But the distribution between short- and
long-term unemployment is itself related in part to the level and duration of
unemployment benefits. Insofar as benefits set a "reservation wage" not far
below wages when employed they reduce the disincentive for wage increases
that risk costing jobs while increasing the incentive for unemployed workers to
hold out for jobs that pay close to previous wages, at the same time as
employers are reluctant to hire at those wages - effects which are prolonged to
the extent that the duration of the benefits is prolonged. The net result would be
to increase the duration of unemployment, and with it the proportion of long-
term unemployed, thereby reducing the pressure of total unemployment on
wages.
These arguments point to mechanisms by which some labor market
institutions can turn some of the unemployment that is induced by reductions in
demand growth into structural unemployment that will be less responsive to
subsequent increases in demand growth, an effect which increases with the
duration of unemployment (Layard et al., 1991, De Grauwe, 1998).   If
institutions that transform demand-induced unemployment into structural
unemployment by such mechanisms characterize labor regimes in Europe more
than in the U.S., that could certainly be part of the explanation for the
successively greater divergence in unemployment trends between them. But this
does not mean that differences in macroeconomic policy are not also part of the
explanation. If macroeconomic policy not only induces an initial increase in
unemployment through measures restricting demand growth but also keeps
unemployment high through the continuation of its restrictive stance, it is likely
to contribute to the growth of long-term unemployment. Thus, if measures that
increase unemployment by reducing demand growth are not rapidly reversed,
macroeconomic policy itself may contribute to an increase in structural
unemployment. As our comparison of American and European policy indicated,
restrictive measures, especially in monetary policy, were indeed more rapidly
reversed in the U.S. than in Europe. Insofar as this difference in the central
banks’ reaction function made unemployment more persistent in Europe and24
thereby increased the share of long-term unemployment, it may have had a lot to
do with the successively higher levels of unemployment in Europe.
To the extent that the prolongation of restrictive policy increases long-
term unemployment, it has potentially perverse feed-back effects that increase
the unemployment costs of a price-stability regime. The longer a central bank
depresses demand growth to keep unemployment from falling below what it
regards as the level consistent with its price stability objective - i.e, its judgment
as to the equilibrium rate of unemployment - the larger the proportion of
unemployment likely to turn into structural unemployment. Accordingly, as
noted earlier, there is a decline in the proportion of any given level of
unemployment that functions to inhibit wage inflation (whether by workers
successfully pressing wage demands or by employers successfully bidding
scarce workers away from each other) - i.e., a decreasing proportion of
unemployed workers consists of those credibly competing for jobs with
employed workers or likely to be hired quickly when employers seek more
labor. From the central bank’s point of view the effective unemployment rate is
thereby pushed toward or below the equilibrium rate. At best, this gives it
reason not to increase demand growth to lower unemployment or, at worst,
reason to decrease demand further in order to bring the effective unemployment
rate back up to what it believes is the equilibrium rate! The ECB’s contention
that Europe’s unemployment cannot be remedied by expansion of demand
without risking increased inflation because most of the unemployment is
structural could in this way be a self-fulfilling - or exceeding - prophecy.
25
The more general proposition to which the preceding discussion points is
that while labor regime differences, of some kinds more than others, may indeed
help explain the difference in employment performance between continental
Europe and the U.S., they cannot be the whole explanation, as postulated in the
EMU policy regime’s rationale, any more than differences in macroeconomic
policy can be. Thus, even if there are still many unsettled issues and much
additional evidence remains to be considered, the argument in support of the
current EMU orthodoxy that ascribes the difference in European and American
unemployment trends almost entirely to the difference in labor regimes breaks
down once the difference in macroeconomic policy is taken into account.
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4. Curing Europe’s Unemployment
If more restrictive macroeconomic policy than in the U.S. is the main or at least
an important factor in causing Europe’s higher unemployment, this does not
mean that "structural reforms" in labor markets are not necessary in curing it,
even if they alone cannot do so. Whatever the relative importance of
macroeconomic policy and labor regimes in causing unemployment, accepting
that both are involved, their relative importance in curing it may be different. In
part, this is because of the tendency, cited earlier, of unemployment that is
largely caused and prolonged by insufficient demand to turn into structural
unemployment that is decreasingly responsive to a renewal of demand. This
implies that to avert a tightening of labor markets and accelerating wages at
earlier stages of recovery than would have been the case if demand had been
expanded sooner, there is an increased need for measures such those that can
facilitate re-employment. These include "active" labor market policies designed
to bring the long-term unemployed back into the labor market and re-equip
them for employment. Such measures for improving the "employability" of the
long-term unemployed are of course a central feature of the EU’s Employment
Strategy. Their macroeconomic effect is presumably to increase the portion of
unemployment that acts as a restraint on wage pressures, thereby lowering the
equilibrium unemployment rate and encouraging the authorities to pursue more
expansionary policies than they would in the absence of such supply-side
measures.
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But this does not support the ECB position, and the Employment Strategy
that acquiesces in it, that the reduction in unemployment has to come almost
entirely from such supply-side measures, along with other structural reforms in
the labor market. For one thing, employability itself seems to vary with levels of
unemployment to some extent independently of its duration and the presence or
absence of active labor market policies. For example, in the currently tight U.S.
labor market, with virtually nothing in the way of labor market policies,
employers are seeking out workers previously thought to be unemployable.
Thus, employers are going into the black ghettoes of some central cities to find
workers, providing the training needed for the jobs they seek to fill, thereby
contributing to the recent diminution in the difference in unemployment rates of
blacks and whites (Freeman and Rodgers, 1999). More generally, U.S. evidence
shows that unemployment among those who are relatively disadvantaged in
labor markets - less educated, nonwhites, and less-skilled women - fluctuates
                                                          
26. The measures include not only such benign policies on employability as well as against
discrimination but also retrenchment of benefits, job security, and collective bargaining so as
to intensify the pressure of market forces on workers. For a brief wish list, see Calmfors
(1998: 141-42).26
more than that of the relatively advantaged - more educated white males
(Hoynes, 1999). In other words, workers are in effect lined up in queues in
order of what employers regard as desirable characteristics (race and gender as
well as skills). As unemployment goes up, employers go higher on the queues
when they hire or lay off workers, and go lower on the queues as unemployment
declines. At least some part of the concentration of unemployment on the less
skilled is therefore simply a function of high unemployment rather than a
function of the skill requirements of a given state of technology and work
organization.  Thus, if macroeconomic policy expands demand so that labor
markets tighten, that by itself increases the job chances of those who had the
hardest time finding jobs when unemployment was higher. Moreover, the
supply of labor also tends to increase as labor markets tighten simply because
discouraged workers who dropped out of the labor market are drawn back into it
by the brighter prospects of finding jobs.
For another thing, even though active labor market and other policies can
nevertheless facilitate re-employment in various ways, they can do so only to
the extent that there is demand for the labor which the policies may make more
qualified and readily available. For example, when unemployment is high, even
the most ambitious re-training programs such as those in Sweden may simply
cycle the unemployed through repeated spells of training, which may do little
more than maintain their attachment to the labor market so that it is easier for
them to be re-employed when demand for labor is renewed.
It is probably still true that unemployment caused by deficient demand is
not entirely or quickly reversible without renewing inflationary pressures by a
restoration of demand, but the extent to which this is so is unsettled. However,
considerations such as those just cited suggest that an expansion of demand can
reduce unemployment without increasing inflation to a greater extent than
assumed in the EMU orthodoxy. There is the separate issue of how much of an
increase in inflation should set the limit on demand growth.
27 The 2 percent
upper limit which the ECB apparently places on inflation may well be too low,
so that an expansion of demand that is aborted by tightening monetary policy as
soon as that limit is approached means that there can never be sufficient
sustained expansion to significantly reduce unemployment (De Grauwe, 1998).
That this is probably so is a fundamental reason why the price stability
macroeconomic policy regime built into EMU, as the ECB apparently interprets
it, could doom Europe to continued high unemployment. Given the years it will
take to reduce Europe’s very high and long-lasting unemployment, the amount
                                                          
27 For arguments that some inflation facilitates resource allocation and that very low or zero
inflation exacts permanent real costs that exceed its benefits, see Tobin (1972) and Akerlof et
al. (1996).27
of investment that would have to be sustained over those years in order to create
the number of jobs needed may simply not be forthcoming without a
modification in the EMU macroeconomic policy regime that assures investment
decision makers that an expansion of demand will be sustained long enough to
assure the profitability of the needed investment even if the inflation rate rises
above the 2 percent which now appears to be the upper limit of the target range.
The point here is not that the stance of macroeconomic policy is too
restrictive at the time of writing in early 2000, so that policies need to be
changed to stimulate demand at this juncture. There are widespread indications
of recovery and accelerating growth in Euroland, especially in the larger
economies in which unemployment has been highest, so no further stimulus
may be needed now. The question is how the ECB will conduct monetary policy
in response to this expansion: will it do so in ways that lead investment
decision-makers to believe that it will "give growth a chance," or that it will
choke off the expansion before it induces a rise in investment sufficient to
significantly reduce unemployment? In other words, the question is whether the
ECB is committed to a price stability regime as restrictive as its declared
interpretation of its mandate suggests that it is. It is still not clear that it is, even
though the ECB has already responded by tightening monetary policy in several
increments, albeit small ones, offsetting the slight loosening in response to the
Asian financial crisis. On the other hand, those interest rate increases certainly
offer little basis for confidence that the ECB is committed to a more
expansionary policy regime.28
5. Conclusion
It would not necessarily take a revision of the Treaty to bring about such a
change in investor expectations. The Treaty requires the ECB to support the
economic policies of the EU providing that it is done consistently with price
stability but it leaves it up to the ECB to define price stability. The ECB could
accordingly announce that it now interprets the price stability goal with which
the pursuit of EU goals of growth and employment must be consistent as a
steady underlying central inflation rate (i.e., excluding external price
fluctuations such as those for oil) of around 2 percent or even somewhat more,
averaged over some specified period. That would imply that the inflation rate
would be allowed to exceed the central rate, under specified conditions, so that
there need not be fear that the monetary brakes would be put on as soon as
inflation moves up toward the 2 percent upper limit of the permissible range. It
would of course then be necessary for the ECB to use its monetary policy
instruments consistently with that new definition of price stability, and to reach
agreement with member states on coordinated fiscal policies so as to secure a
sustainable policy mix for Euroland as a whole.
28
What it would take for the present governing board of the ECB to
actually move toward a macroeconomic policy regime that assumes some
responsibility for growth and employment as well as price stability, as does the
U.S. Fed, is yet another question. It would probably take a great deal more
political pressure than the governments of the EMU member states now seem
prepared to exert, perhaps sufficient to induce some resignations in protest, and
perhaps even a revision of the Treaty that explicitly makes the bank responsible
for growth and employment as well as price stability.
29
Whatever it would take, if such a long-term commitment of EMU
macroeconomic policy to reducing unemployment could be established, it
would open up the possibility of combining a gradual, carefully calibrated
expansion of demand with a wide range of structural measures facilitating re-
employment and inhibiting inflationary pressures, enabling the interaction of
such a combination of macroeconomic and structural policies to be sustained for
the long time needed for them to have its cumulative effect on unemployment.
30
                                                          
28. This would include the tighter fiscal policies in member states with greater inflationary
pressures than others. On the need for fiscal policy coordination, see Muet and Pisani-Ferry
(1999) and Soskice (1999).
29. The Fed is obligated by law (the Humphrey-Hawkins Act) to direct monetary policies to
the goals of growth and employment as well as price stability.
30. For a discussion of what such a strategy might look like, see Bean (1997) and the comment
on it by Fischer. See also Blanchard and Fitoussi29
In the context of such a "two-handed" strategy, social pacts could provide
a valuable, even indispensable, method for bringing about and maintaining
political support for the institutional changes needed and the attenuation of
conflict over the distribution of the burdens and benefits of the long process of
reducing unemployment. But if Europe is condemned to struggle against
unemployment without the support of a more expansionary macroeconomic
policy regime - with one hand tied behind its back - social pacts can do little to
reduce unemployment in Euroland as a whole and could degenerate into a set of
competing national beggar-thy-neighbor strategies which, in the worst case,
would interact with restrictive ECB monetary and national fiscal policies to
drive a deflationary vicious circle.
Andrew Martin
Center for European Studies
Harvard University30
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